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immigrants to Iowa would view their experience. As this nation de-
bates immigration policy, this collection can help us see how past poli-
cies developed and how they affected those peoples whose dreams 
included America. 
  
 
Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828–1965, 
by Mark Aldrich. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 
xvi, 446 pp. Illustrations, tables, graphs, notes, appendixes, essay on 
sources, index. $59.95 cloth. 
Reviewer John Williams-Searle is director of the Center for Citizenship, Race, 
and Ethnicity Studies (CREST), the College of Saint Rose, Albany, New York. 
He is the author of “Courting Risk: Disability, Masculinity, and Liability on 
Iowa’s Railroads, 1868–1900” (Annals of Iowa, 1999). 
Mark Aldrich has written the field-defining work on railroad safety. In 
so doing, he reveals how technological innovation and public percep-
tion changed the relationship between the state and industry from 
1828 to 1965. Through a mix of econometrics, policy and technology 
research, and social and cultural analysis, Aldrich delivers a perfect 
balance of intellectual rigor and subtle wit to rescue material that in 
other hands could be both dry and downbeat.  
 According to Aldrich, the early years of railroad development 
created “a uniquely American system of railroading that was also 
uniquely dangerous” (10). Long distances and sparse traffic necessi-
tated an infrastructure so lightly built that it astounded skeptical 
European observers. The use of cost-saving measures such as light 
iron strap rails, single-track mainlines, and technologically inferior 
cast iron wheels contributed to the financial viability of American rail-
roads but led to increased hazards for workers and passengers. The 
dizzying number of railroading accidents during the early years might 
lead one to conclude that there was little concern with safety regulation. 
Massachusetts took early action in the 1830s to require crossing mark-
ers and audible signals, but state regulation was haphazard at best. In-
stead, railroad companies and states developed a reactive relationship 
that Aldrich dubs volunteerism: whenever state regulatory agencies or 
legislatures threatened to actively police railroad safety, companies 
would voluntarily respond by incorporating new safety technologies 
and implementing new policies to demonstrate their good faith efforts 
to keep the passengers (though not their workers) safe. This basic 
pattern of threats and modest response remained little changed until 
Congress passed the Federal Railroad Safety Act, establishing federal 
control over all railroad safety in 1970. 
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 While volunteerism sped up progress on passenger safety and 
may have been driven by public outrage over sensational crashes and 
explosions, it also helped companies to avoid addressing the so-called 
“little accident” that the public overlooked. Such small, everyday 
events resulted in the maiming or death of a single person (usually a 
railroad employee or trespasser) and added up to thousands of casual-
ties over time. Outraged citizens responded to the scary possibilities of 
a chemical spill but tended to ignore grade crossing accidents, which 
killed far more people over time. Risk perception and the avoidance of 
bad press drove volunteerism, to the public’s detriment. 
 Further, Aldrich demonstrates that railroads used economic effi-
ciency as the central measure in deciding whether to adopt safety 
technologies and policies. For example, when the Federal Employers 
Liability Act (1908) made companies economically liable for unsafe 
work practices, companies became more focused not just on imple-
menting safety technologies, such as the air brake and automatic cou-
pler, but also new safety training and policies, such as the Safety First 
campaign. Aldrich concludes that financially successful companies 
were the true safety innovators—that safety made good fiscal sense. 
 Despite the strength of Aldrich’s work, there are some flaws that 
detract from his interpretation. Iowans can be proud of their state’s 
place in the railroad safety movement, but one wouldn’t know that 
from reading Aldrich’s book; the Iowa Railroad Safety Appliance Act 
provided the template for the Federal Safety Appliance Act passed in 
1893, but Aldrich gives that part of railroad safety history little atten-
tion. Likewise, he minimizes the contributions of Lorenzo S. Coffin, 
Iowa railroad commissioner during the mid-1880s and tireless railroad 
safety advocate from Fort Dodge, Iowa. Coffin was known nationally 
in the railroad safety movement and was a champion of that impor-
tant force for change—workers themselves. Aldrich usually views 
workers, when he does so at all, through the company’s lens—neg-
ligently amputating their own limbs to undermine the company’s 
safety record. He relies heavily on company records and very little 
on railroad brotherhood journals, which he deems of little worth in 
understanding the development of safety technologies or policies. If 
he had examined such records more closely, however, he would have 
found that workers had a sophisticated understanding of volunteerism 
and eagerly involved themselves in a three-sided, usually cooperative 
relationship among employers, workers, and the state regulatory agen-
cies. Railroad brotherhoods hired lobbyists to pressure politicians, and 
they cultivated public sympathies through poetry, art, song, and story. 
At every turn, they strove to improve safety incrementally while pre-
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serving profitability, knowing full well that a bankrupt railroad would 
not need engineers. To argue, as Aldrich does, that railroad safety de-
veloped primarily as a result of the push and pull between railroad 
companies and the state is to miss one-third of the debate. That said, 
Aldrich’s work does provide an important corrective to the simplistic 
notion that railroad companies wanted nothing to do with safety be-
fore the era of federal regulation. 
 
 
The Architecture of Madness: Insane Asylums in the United States, by Carla 
Yanni. Architecture, Landscape, and Material Culture Series. Minnea-
polis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007. xi, 256 pp. Illustrations, 
appendixes, notes, bibliography, index. $27.50 paper.  
Reviewer Jane Simonsen is assistant professor of history and women’s/gender 
studies at Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois. She is the author of Making 
Home Work: Domesticity and Native American Assimilation in the American West, 
1860–1919 (2006). 
They ranged from small private asylums to sprawling country estates, 
from urban fortresses to cottage retreats. Celebrated architects Calvert 
Vaux, H. H. Richardson, and Frederick Law Olmsted designed them. 
Signs of civic accomplishment, moral healing, and architectural gran-
deur, insane asylums, Carla Yanni argues, exhibit the intersections 
between medical and material culture. Describing the nineteenth-
century asylum as a “place of struggle” over the relationship between 
space and power, Yanni traces the cultural ideals built into asylum 
walls. She departs from histories of mental illness that acknowledge 
collaboration between architects and asylum managers as an interest-
ing facet of psychiatric history in order to examine asylums them-
selves within U.S. cultural and architectural history. 
 Yanni begins, as many histories of mental illness do, by explaining 
how treatment in the United States borrowed from and reacted to the 
control of the insane in Europe, exemplified by hospitals such as Beth-
lem (Bedlam) in England. She explores the plan envisioned by psy-
chiatrist Thomas Kirkbride, whose methods relied on categorization, 
separation, and a healthy atmosphere distinguished by light, ventila-
tion, and distinctions between public and private space. There were 
many incarnations of this plan; these were marked less by consistency 
than by adaptations borne of necessity. Yanni highlights struggles to 
make medical ideals manifest in these enormous constructions as well 
as the importance of the edifice itself in presenting a public face to 
supporters. Constraints such as space, money, time, and public per-
ception of mental illness created obstacles, as the ambitious plan was 
